Incentives for DB plans

The Governor of the Bank of Canada, Mr David Dodge, has been singing defined benefit pension plans' praises in a recent speech. He recognised that "an effective defined-benefit pension system is a tremendous asset for individuals, for employers, and for our society as a whole", but is currently hampered by a number of disincentives, which favour DC over DB for sponsors. Specifically, he lists

uncertainties over the legal status of actuarial surplus

overly restrictive solvency requirements,

transition from smoothed accounting numbers to fair value accounting

group longevity risk

insufficient transparency about cost / financing of newly introduced benefits

lack of large multi-employer DB plans.

We agree with both parts of the analysis, namely that DB plans are preferable to DC, and that there is currently a lack of incentives for DB plans. We strongly disagree however with Mr Dodge's opposition to fair value accounting. He claims, essentially, that we are not interested in today's values, but in expected values far into the future. We think that analysts of pensions are very much interested in today's values. For one, every expected future value can be discounted to a current present value (assuming that the term structure holds). Thus, Mr Dodge's distinction would essentially become moot.

More importantly however, it is not at all clear at which specific point "far into the future" the expected value would need to be formed - surely that cannot be discretionary? How about changes to those expected future values, based on variations of underlying assumptions? Finally, the volatility introduced to sponsors' balance sheets is not artificial, it's an economic fact. Cognition of that fact is a prerequisite of sponsors' ability to manage the inherent economic risk of their DB plans and, therefore, an enabler of an effective defined-benefit pension system.